Trade policy with the lights on: linking trade and politicization by Gheyle, Niels
Trade Policy with the Lights on 
Linking trade and politicization 
 
 
 
 
Niels Gheyle 
Centre for European Union Studies (CEUS) 
Department of Political Science – Ghent University 
Niels.Gheyle@UGent.be 
 
Draft – comments appreciated 
 
 
 
 
Prepared for the conference: 
„EU Trade Policy at the Crossroads: between Economic Liberalism and Democratic 
Challenges” 
 
4 – 6 February 2016 
Vienna, Austria 
 
Abstract:  
As the most hotly debated trade topic in recent history, several observers have dubbed TTIP a 
‘politicized’ issue. Yet in the trade literature, there has not been much attention to what the 
latter concept entails, nor what its drivers and consequences are. I argue that we need to 
explicitly link the scholarly fields of trade and politicization, not only to explain several societal 
features in the TTIP debate, but also because it carries constraining consequences for policy-
makers on national and European level, and because this link will be increasingly relevant in 
the future. Through a selected review of the politicization literature, I want to show that linking 
these fields is beneficial in both ways. This opens up a research agenda that maps, explains and 
investigates the consequences of the increasing societal contestation of trade policy, 
manifested through public debates, mobilization efforts and rising citizen awareness. 
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1 – Introduction 
 
“The [TTIP] debate is a few degrees hotter in Germany than in other countries. But I am not able 
to sociologically analyze that.” – Cecilia Malmström (Tost, 2015) 
 
Over the last decade and a half, there have been several instances where the elite game of 
international relations has responded to criticism of civil society organizations (CSOs)1 or even 
citizen groups. Regarding trade policy, the most prominent examples were the successful 
opposition to the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (1998), the breakdown of the Seattle WTO 
negotiations (1999) and the resistance to the GATS negotiations (2000) and the Economic 
Partnership Agreements (2004). More recently, the Anti-Counterfeiting Agreement (ACTA) was 
shot down in the European Parliament, a move mainly attributed to civil society mobilization and 
campaigning (Dür & Mateo, 2014). The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) 
currently being negotiated is accompanied by one of the fiercest trade debates in recent history, 
which has had the European Commission (hereafter: Commission) on the defensive since 
negotiations were launched in 2013. On several occasions it has responded to these societal 
outbursts and already changed some elements of the agreement; moves that have been attributed 
to civil society engagement and attention for the topic. With the European Parliament (EP) directly 
accountable to European citizens and more aware of its new Lisbon powers to veto international 
agreements, it is now even unclear if TTIP will make the final EP ratification hurdle – if negotiations 
reach that phase. Other preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (the EU-Canada (CETA) and the 
Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA) in particular) have felt the fallout of this politicization of TTIP. 
This societal politicization is a remarkable episode, as European trade policy has not always ignited 
a lot of enthusiasm or spontaneous debate amongst politicians, journalists, interest groups, let 
alone citizens. For decades, a large share of society seemed indifferent to the technical (and boring) 
negotiations of free trade agreements, which for consumers would result (as classical economics 
states) in more choice and lower prices in a variety of products. Nor was attention seen as useful 
because observers were critical of the role that civil society or ordinary citizens could play. Studies 
on the drivers of European trade policy have been skeptical about the potential of CSOs to exert 
influence (Jarman, 2008; Woll, 2007). Dür and De Bièvre (2007) find that NGOs have been actively 
consulted over the past years, leading to increased access, but that this hasn’t resulted in real 
influence. Furthermore, the view that business pulls the strings remains persistent and is evidenced 
both in these results of scholarly literature as in the sole focus on business organizations in 
academic literature (Beyers, 2004; Bouwen, 2002; Dür, Bernhagen, & Marshall, 2015; Dür & De 
Bièvre, 2007; Schmitter & Streeck, 1991).  
                                                          
1 Even though not entirely the same and overlapping to some extent, I will use the concepts of ‘civil 
society organizations (CSOs)’ and ‘non-governmental organizations (NGOs) interchangeably. 
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Not many people had therefore predicted the forces that would unleash and have dominated 
popular debate after the negotiations on TTIP begun. There is thus a very topical and persisting 
need to analyze what is happening, to explain recent episodes of increased contestation and 
opposition to trade policy (which take place on European level but also vary significantly from 
Member State to Member State), to investigate what the possible consequences for TTIP (and 
future trade policy) could be, and, lastly, why this is important for future research. In this paper, I 
argue that to further our understanding of the current contentious episode of TTIP (and our 
broader knowledge about the trade literature in several dimensions) we should look to the literature 
on politicization. 
The politicization concept has only started to attract significant attention over the last 10 years (De 
Wilde, 2011). Although the concept itself has become central to various research projects, 
predominantly present in studies assessing European integration or the European Union as an 
authoritative international institution (Hooghe & Marks, 2009; Kriesi et al., 2012; Schmitter, 1969; 
Zürn, Binder, & Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012), it has been used in many different ways and was not always 
explained in detail (De Wilde, 2011). With regards to trade policy, some authors have stated that 
the field has been politicized in the past (Faber & Orbie, 2007), but it has never been elaborated 
what this meant and what consequences this entailed. This paper thus shows that the linking of the 
trade and politicization literature is fruitful and will be increasingly relevant. 
Section 2 starts with an assessment of why we should focus on politicization when studying trade 
policy, with TTIP in particular. We should do this, firstly, to broaden our understanding of why 
TTIP is such a hotly debated topic, in general, but also why manifestations of this politicization 
differ greatly between Member States. Secondly, politicization of TTIP has already proven 
constraining and led to real changes, which is in itself interesting, but also directs us to ask what 
part this plays in Member State preference formation. Thirdly, I argue that it will also be 
increasingly important to focus on this interlinkage. Section 3 then gives a selected overview of the 
contemporary literature on politicization, and shows that several processes and developments can 
be supported with theoretical concepts elaborated in this literature field. Section 4 concludes and 
gives directions to further research. 
2 – Linking trade and politicization 
 
2.1 Societal forces in TTIP 
 
It is already a truism to state that TTIP has become a contentious issue over the last two years. 
Different manifestations, such as interest group mobilization, media reporting, political debates 
and even citizen awareness, have made observers along the field state that this is a ‘politicized’ 
issue. De Wilde (2011) establishes a working definition of this concept: “An increase in polarization 
of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards the 
process of policy formulation within the European Union”. It is a focus on “the communicative 
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processes that lead to an increasing intensity and controversy of debates on international 
institutions in the broader public, encompassing not only political executives but also party 
politicians, NGOs, and other interest groups” (Schmidtke, 2014) . In the case of the EU it is “the 
mobilization of mass public opinion with regard to EU policies and institutions” (Hooghe & Marks, 
2009). For Schmitter (1969), it referred to “a widening of the audience or clientele interested and 
active as a consequence of the increasing controversiality of issues”. It is “making collectively 
binding decisions a matter or an object of public discussion” (Zürn, 2014). In this paragraph, I point 
to two particular features of the TTIP debate (interlocking societal forces and a differentiated 
picture of contestation around Europe) and show that we need broader models or theories to 
explain these, and that the concept of politicization entails these features. 
 
Interlocking societal forces 
 
Different ‘manifestations’ of politicization (as described above) and the links between have a long 
history of scholarly attention. Citizen awareness and attitudes on policy issues have often been 
studied in models that point at occupation and varying factor endowments (Blonigen, 2011; Mayda 
& Rodrik, 2005) or comparative advantages (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001) as explanatory variables. 
Mobilization efforts by interest groups as well, have traditionally been studied in classic 
(economistic) theories of International Political Economy (IPE)2, and – since the shift to the new 
trade politics has been materializing (Young & Peterson, 2006) – will now be increasingly 
benefitting from scholarly literature on regulatory cooperation (Nicolaidis & Shaffer, 2005). 
These are extremely useful theories in economics and political science and are essential building 
blocks in explaining mobilization, awareness or broader public debates. However, the picture is – 
naturally – more qualified than these economistic models often presume. The changing nature of 
trade politics (more focus on domestic rules and standards), for example, may prove more salient 
(Beyers & Kerremans, 2007), which makes factor endowments of little use, both for awareness and 
mobilization. Identity and loss-of-sovereignty concerns (cfr. GAL-TAN; Hooghe, Marks, and 
Wilson (2002)) may have an impact on our view of trade and globalization as well. But especially 
the relationship between interest group activity, media, public opinion and political activity cannot 
be neglected or downplayed.  
Interest groups can be effective in shaping public opinion if their message framing is consistent 
with pre-existing beliefs ((Dür, 2015; Dür & Mateo, 2014). Eliasson (2015), for example, argues that 
TTIP campaigners successfully tapped into deeper socio-cultural concerns connected to food safety, 
which made even the slightest possibility that TTIP will have an impact on this a major problem. 
Indeed, Dür (2015) shows that strong framing of TTIP issues has had an impact on public opinion, 
especially if knowledge and/or awareness for a topic was low before, which necessitates a 
                                                          
2 Cfr. Heckscher-Ohlin and Stolper-Samuelson theorems (Cuyvers, Embrechts, & Rayp, 2002) 
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passionate campaign (Burstein, 2010). By making a highly technical subject such as ISDS salient, 
and educating the public on this low-awareness topic, TTIP campaigners succeeded in doing this 
(Eliasson, 2015). 
Vice versa, increasing public salience makes more interest groups active on a certain issue (as 
witnessed in the ACTA debate, cfr. Dür and Mateo (2014)), as the logic of survival dictates interest 
groups to be in the spotlight if they want to secure future (financial) support (Berkhout, 2013; 
Binderkrantz, 2005). Active outside lobbying thus raises salience, which leads to even more groups 
becoming interested in the topic, which galvanizes public opinion even further (Dür & Mateo, 
2014). Eliasson (2015) concludes that, while it is difficult to find causal relationships, there is a 
clear correlation between interest group campaigns, shifting public opinion and developments in 
TTIP, especially since support for free trade as such did not alter much in the same period.  
Media coverage, furthermore, both informs, but also shapes public opinion (Page, Shapiro, & 
Dempsey, 1987). Articles on TTIP in major global papers (and national quality newspapers) rose as 
interest group were active and the public became aware of the issue (Eliasson, 2015). The other way 
around, public opinion drives media coverage on issues that are not primarily connected to 
spectacular events (such as trade policy) (Uscinski, 2009). With media coverage, the incentives for 
interest groups to become active rise as well (cfr. Logic of survival). Interest groups themselves of 
course try to frame debates in such a way that they are picked up by media and ultimately by public 
opinion (Andsager, 2000). Political parties have incentives to take a stance on salient issues, again 
providing for stories in mass media, and providing cues and frames for citizens (Dür, 2015). 
It is not the purpose of this paper to show all the links at work here in detail (there are many!), but 
this shows that there are numerous links between public opinion, mobilization of interest groups, 
mass media (public debates) and political activity. If politicization means that “issues that did not 
catch the eye of the general public previously are debated in the public sphere” (Rixen & Zangl, 
2013), all these manifestations and links have to do with and are part of ‘politicization’. We should 
therefore look into this concept more deeply to have a broader conception of the societal forces at 
work in TTIP, which transcends a too narrow look into one or two variables.  
Differentiated picture 
Another key feature of this episode is that the debate and criticism on TTIP has flared up in some 
Member States, but not in others, which makes for a very differentiated picture. ‘Episodes of 
contention’ (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2009) are significantly bound to domestic arenas. De Ville 
and Siles-Brügge (2015) note this differentiation in mobilization patterns and mass media as well: 
“we have an anomaly of countries such as the UK and Germany – where TTIP has been subject of 
parliamentary debates, regular news programs and demonstrations and which possess well-
organized anti-TTIP NGO coalitions – and others where the issue has barely been discussed at all 
in the public sphere”. Stuckatz (2015) finds that interest group mobilization (as measured by 
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newspaper data mentions) is the highest in Germany and Austria, while almost negligible in e.g. 
Spain and even France. 
Focusing on European citizens’ awareness of and engagement with TTIP points to the same 
conclusion. Of the 150.000 contributions to the ISDS public consultation in 2014, more than 80% 
originated from just 3 countries: Austria, the UK and Germany. The ‘Stop TTIP’ campaigners 
collected signatures all over Europe as part of their (self-organized) European Citizens’ Initiative, 
but almost half of the 3.2 million signatures are from Germany, and countries such as Austria, 
France, UK and Belgium have more than tripled the required quorums (Stop TTIP, 2015). Public 
protests in Berlin (October 2015) assembled about 150.000 citizens on the streets during the 
International Days of Action against TTIP (Johnston, 2015), but hardly anyone marched the streets 
of Bratislava or Budapest. Measured via citizen attitudes in Eurobarometer statistics, opposition to 
an FTA with the US is highest in Germany, Slovenia, Luxembourg and Austria (see table 1). 
Moreover, in this same group public opposition against TTIP has been on the rise and – in the case 
of Germany – now amounts to more than half of the population.  
 For Against Don't know 
 2014/11 2015/05 2014/11 2015/05 2014/11 2015/5 
Austria 39 23 53 67 8 10 
Germany 39 31 41 51 20 18 
Luxembourg 40 37 43 49 17 14 
Slovenia 57 46 31 42 12 12 
Belgium 66 53 26 35 8 12 
France 50 53 32 33 18 14 
Slovakia 62 56 26 29 12 15 
Greece 61 66 32 28 7 6 
EU 58 56 25 28 17 16 
Netherlands 74 63 18 27 8 10 
Hungary 62 63 28 26 10 11 
Croatia 67 63 23 26 10 11 
Italy 58 58 22 24 20 18 
Sweden 59 64 26 23 15 13 
Czech 
Republic 
62 62 25 23 13 15 
Portugal 60 60 23 23 17 17 
Finland 62 58 21 22 17 20 
Cyprus 59 64 25 21 16 15 
Latvia 66 62 18 21 16 17 
UK 65 63 19 20 16 17 
Spain 63 63 19 19 18 18 
Denmark 71 66 17 18 12 16 
Bulgaria 64 67 14 15 22 18 
Estonia 72 63 11 14 17 23 
Poland 73 71 11 14 16 15 
7 
 
Ireland 71 77 15 12 14 11 
Romania 75 78 11 10 14 12 
Malta 75 79 11 7 14 14 
Lithuania 79 79 9 7 12 14 
Table 1. Q: What is your opinion on each of the following statements? A free trade and investment 
agreement between the EU and the USA. Source: Eurobarometer 82/83 
The specific bones of contention are also dependent on the Member State (Atlantic Community, 
2015): the UK fears a privatization of the NHS, the Germans have sovereignty and food concerns 
(especially on GMOs), Italian CSOs and citizens are worried about aggressive competition for their 
local SMEs (Di Sisto, 2014), and the French are concerned about protection of local agriculture and 
geographical indications (Von der Burchard & Barigazzi, 2015). A shared skepticism (or total 
rejection) of the investor-to-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) mechanism is present in several 
Member States. Eastern Europe on the other hand, is practically silent in this debate (also on ISDS) 
and countries such as Romania (cfr. Iftodi, 2015), Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia show the 
highest levels of support for TTIP in 2014, even higher than traditionally pro-trade states like the 
Scandinavian and Anglo-Saxon countries. 
This divergent picture needs deeper explanation. Several individual explanations can be furthered, 
such as a strong anti-American feeling in Germany and France, strong NGO presence in 
Luxembourg, or strong potential negative (economic) effects in Italy, but again we need a broader 
picture. All countries will potentially be affected by TTIP (even though effects will differ) and we 
need to look at the intermediating factors that drive domestic politicization.  
2.2 Constraining consequences and Member State positions 
 
TTIP (re)positioning 
 
Advocates of TTIP, with the Commission in particular, have since the start of the negotiations been 
on the defensive. The civil society movement that has led the campaign has grown in size and variety 
of opponents, and has found traction in public opinion as well (Eliasson, 2015; Dür, 2015). The 
Commission has not been deaf to these concerns, acknowledging in the new ‘Trade for all’ strategy 
that “We’ve listened to the debate” (European Commission, 2015b). For one, this recognition has 
led the Commission on a PR-quest, in order to appease the harshest criticisms and ‘sell’ the 
agreement to the public. Already before negotiations started, a leaked internal document showed 
the Commission’s attempt to “further […] our communication effort at Member State level in a 
radically different way to what has been done for past trade initiatives” in order to “reduce fears 
and avoid a mushrooming of doubts” (CEO, 2013). Especially since Commissioner Malmström took 
over the trade post, an aggressive communications campaign took off to allay public’s concerns with 
promises of a “new start” (Eberhardt, 2014), even though she has reiterated consistently that it is 
the Member States’ job to explain TTIP’s value to citizens (Von der Burchard, 2015). 
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In parallel to this discourse on refreshing the talks and demystifying concerns, several changes have 
followed in response to those parts of the deal that have attracted most attention and criticism. 
Transparency is one of them: specific websites, Twitter accounts, written summaries of each 
negotiating round, published factsheets and EU negotiating documents, disclosure of the 
negotiating mandate, and an all-round improved access to documents, are amongst the batch of 
changes that were put in place (see e.g. European Commission, 2014). Several of these provisions 
have been ‘codified’ (at least in principle) in the new trade strategy called ‘Trade for All’ (European 
Commission, 2015b), which is thus consolidating transparency practices for future agreements. 
Another toxic element of the deal, the investor-to-state-dispute-settlement (ISDS) mechanism, was 
so controversial it made the Commission abort talks on this chapter, start a public consultation and 
propose a new Investment Court System (ICS) to replace “old-ISDS” (European Commission, 
2015a). It was furthermore forced to mitigate the scope of the horizontal regulatory cooperation 
chapter, which would have bestowed a Regulatory Cooperation Council with the power to adopt 
legal acts (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015). Sectoral provisions on cosmetics that would have led to 
mutual recognition of lists of banned and authorized substances have been scaled downwards to 
“convergence of data requirements and scientific safety assessment methods”, a move welcomed 
by CSOs (Goyens, 2015).  
 
It therefore seems that politicization has actual constraining effects (cfr. Hooghe & Marks, 2009). 
Developments in TTIP were (to some extent) influenced by public opinion, mobilization efforts and 
media reporting, which make up the most obvious forms of politicization. Further research on this 
process and its consequences therefore shifts our focus to politicization literature in order to 
explain and understand public policy changes in the trade field. These effects could even be more 
outspoken with regards to Member States (who still have a large role to play in trade policy) as the 
link between policy makers and constitutions (and  thus electoral incentives) is bigger here than on 
European level.  
 
Member State preferences 
The added value of politicization literature is not confined to TTIP. If Member State positions and 
preferences in trade are to some extent influenced by societal politicization, the prospect of linking 
trade and politicization works retroactively as well. Niemann (2004), for example, claims that 
Spain was the only state opposing the Basic Telecom proposal in the late nineties because the issue 
was ‘domestically politicized’. Bollen (2016) correctly states that “there’s an entire world of politics 
contained in this sentence, but we do not get any insight in why this was so, or why Spain eventually 
yielded to the Commission’s pressure”. The explanatory value of our overarching trade models is to 
some extent ‘incomplete’ if we refuse to look at singular atoms (and how they work) and only at the 
molecule itself. Being able to explain why exactly Spain (and not any other Member State) is 
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‘domestically politicized’, and how this societal feature influenced its final position enriches our 
current models, and adds to our capacity to explain (and predict) trade policy movements. 
Furthermore, even though the politicization effect may or may not be decisive in explaining 
Member State preferences – which merits additional research– we know very little about Member 
States’ preferences (formation) in trade policy. Bollen (2016) shows that the trade policy literature 
in general has largely neglected Member State positions or uses them only superficially, e.g. as part 
of a variable that determines the Council’s behavior. The general criticism that the trade literature 
has failed to look at Member State preferences and its formation (in which politicization possibly 
takes an important role) is not new (Adriaensen, 2014; Alons, 2013; Young, 2007). However, to 
date, this concern has not been thoroughly addressed. Meunier (2005), for example, acknowledges 
in her seminal work on ‘Trading Voices’ that ‘domestic preferences’ are clearly complementary to 
her institutional analysis, but she nevertheless focuses on the latter.  Bollen (2016) explains why 
this is a problem and provides a broad research agenda, with a focus on deep, comparative and 
long-term research on the black box that is preference formation within Member States. If – but 
more importantly how – politicization played a role in trade preference formation at Member State 
level, is therefore an important question and (re)directs our attention to politicization studies when 
assessing trade policy.  
2.3 Increasing importance 
 
Trade policy in the past has not always been a very exciting and extravagant domain as it seems 
today. Most post-war trade conflicts centered around export-oriented and import-competing 
businesses striving for attention and influence on reciprocal tariff negotiations (Young, 2015). So 
even though (fierce) mobilization on trade did occur at some points, we expect to see this debate 
much more prominent in the future, both on EU and national level, for three reasons. 
Firstly, EU trade policy is becoming increasingly authoritative and thus constitutive of our daily 
life. It has always been an exclusive competence of the EU vis-à-vis the Member States since the 
Treaty of Rome (1956) and there has been a continued spillover to the supranational level over the 
years (Devuyst, 2013). Trade authority is therefore a defining characteristic of the EU’s authority 
in general. The 1990s especially were a decisive moment (e.g. Maastricht Treaty, Single Market 
Program) especially for trade policy, with the conclusion of the WTO Uruguay Round and the 
establishment of the WTO (1994)3. Since then, services, investment, commercial aspects of IPR, 
and an increasing amount of behind-the-border tariffs (as resembled in TBT and SPS rules) have 
come onto the trade radar and are now subject to negotiation in multi-, pluri- and bilateral free 
trade arrangements (Young, 2006). Through trade, the EU is thus increasingly dealing with issues 
                                                          
3 Stephen Gill (1995) has pointed to this period as the “new constitutionalism” of neoliberalism. It was 
meant to reflect a growing institutionalization of neoliberal frameworks and policies into legal and 
quasi-legal agreements, insulating these policies from day-to-day democratic debate and decision-
making (Dierckx, 2012). 
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that were exclusively domestic beforehand (the ‘new trade politics’), which has imposed 
international constraints on domestic maneuvering space (ibid.).  
 
As trade issues rub against these various aspects of domestic politics, citizens became increasingly 
aware that trade decisions taken on European level affect their lives (Meunier, 2005), which meant 
that European trade policy4 itself became more politicized (Hocking, 2004)5. Meunier (2005) 
explains this new-found political salience in parallel with an explosive combination of (i) the 
perceived democratic deficit in the EU; (ii) the traditional distorted interest representation in EU 
trade policy; and (iii) the Pandora's box of democratic legitimacy complaints opened up in Seattle 
(1999). Underlying was a rising authority that was not perceived as legitimate (both in trade and in 
the EU in general; cfr. Zürn et al., 2012). After the millennial turn, governments throughout the 
developed world started to recognize that trade policy could therefore no longer be a technocratic, 
behind-closed-doors policy, without input from civil society (Hocking, 2004).   
 
A widely recognized effect of this changing nature of trade, is that an increasing amount of groups 
(such as NGOs, regulating agencies or legislators) have joined the debate (Hocking, 2004; Young, 
2015; Young & Peterson, 2006). Whereas tariff negotiations (that took up the lion’s share of FTAs 
in the past) were about reciprocal market access and diffuse benefits related to liberalization, 
negotiations on non-trade-barriers (NTBs) deal with (amongst others) rules, standards and 
procedures that could potentially have adverse consequences on trade activity (Young, 2006). 
These are intended to serve public policy objectives, but can to a certain extent be damaging for 
businesses that are engaged in foreign trade relations. The distribution of costs is thus different, 
and subsequent disputes (such as fights over TRIPs, dolphin-unfriendly tuna or reformulated 
gasoline) that were sparked by this trade-off triggered the attention of a multitude of 
(environmental, consumer, development) NGOs that are active on these fronts (Young, 2006). 
They feared a race-to-the-bottom in the wake of competitive deregulation to attract foreign 
investors (Vogel & Kagan, 2004). Once mobilized, these new trade actors often became pro-active 
later on, seeing trade rules not only as a threat, but also as a possible tool for realizing them (Young, 
2006).  
The underlying authoritative forces and legitimacy concerns have not evaporated over the years; 
on the contrary, the Lisbon Treaty (2009) enhanced the EU’s trade authority vis-à-vis the Member 
States once again by supranationalizing previously mixed competences such as services, IPR, and 
above all foreign direct investment (see Van den Putte, De Ville, and Orbie (2014))6. This part of 
                                                          
4 National trade policy may or may not have been contested before supranationalizing several 
competences. 
5 Even though this was actually what policy makers tried to avoid by delegating trade competence to the 
supranational level.  
6 Before, Member States negotiated their own bilateral investment treaties, mainly to protect 
against unfair or uncompensated expropriation (Woolcock, 2010). It is interesting to investigate why 
this issue was not politicized when it was still a national (or mixed) competence. 
11 
 
the EU’s increased authority – translated into the specific investor-to-state-dispute-settlement 
(ISDS) mechanism – has especially come into the spotlight during the TTIP negotiations. This is a 
symptom of the overall increasing authority of European FTAs. With TTIP, the expected rise in 
authority is greater than ever before, as there is now, for example, for the first time the push to 
institutionalize provisions of the (horizontal and vertical) regulatory cooperation chapters 
(European Commission, 2015c). In CETA, these provisions are all voluntary and come down to 
mere intentions that the parties ‘endeavor’ to commit themselves to (cfr. CETA, p. 396)7. At the 
same time, the negotiating partners are also no longer only developing countries, which makes the 
prospect of the EU as the dominant partner diminish, in favor of a situation where compromises 
have to be sought on the EU front as well. This all takes place in a period where Europe as such is 
already in the limelight, with the fallout of the financial crisis, euro crisis, refugee crisis and climate 
concerns all evolving in parallel to trade. 
In sum, the EU’s trade authority has risen over the previous decades, which has shifted more and 
more attention to the supranational level, as trade policy increasingly penetrated domains that were 
previously exclusively domestic policies. This authority drive shows no signs of diminishing in the 
future, as the far-reaching ‘living agreement’ prospect of TTIP could serve as a template for future 
bilateral and WTO negotiations (Beck, 2014). It could therefore be well expected that attention, 
mobilization and debate will not return to pre-TTIP levels. De-politicizing efforts are doomed to 
fail if they do not touch upon this basic rise in authority (cfr. De Wilde & Zürn, 2012; Flinders & 
Büller, 2006). 
Secondly, the potential for trade to attract more and more public attention has been given an 
enormous boost in 2009 with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Institutionally, the biggest 
change for European trade policy is the increased power of the European Parliament (EP) which 
now has veto power over trade agreements (Van den Putte et al. 2014; Kleimann (2011)). Contrary 
to unelected Commission officials and government personnel in the Council who are only 
accountable to the European citizens through a double-step relation, MEPs are directly accountable 
to constituents and thus have incentives to strive for reelection. Richardson (2012) notes that in the 
post-Lisbon era “the EP has proved receptive and has established itself as the guardian of 
vulnerable groups who oppose the conclusion of harmful FTAs”. In an early assessment of the EP’s 
new role, Van den Putte et al. (2014) concluded that MEPs generally support the EU’s liberalization 
agenda, but are susceptible to special protectionist interests within this liberal framework. These 
“vulnerable groups” do not always have to be businesses however. The ACTA negotiations, for 
example, were struck down in a surprise and landmark move by the EP in 2012, most importantly 
because of civil rights mobilization and campaigning (Dür & Mateo, 2014). 
                                                          
7 The full CETA text is available here: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/september/tradoc_152806.pdf  
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Van den Putte, De Ville, and Orbie (2015) conclude that the legal and institutional changes that the 
Lisbon Treaty brought into place have yet to substantialize and be transformed into real power, yet 
the rejection of ACTA enhanced the EP’s credibility as a veto actor and strengthened the influence 
of the EP in the other stages (preparation and negotiation) of trade negotiations in the future. With 
TTIP, this ‘real power’ is surfacing and the EP seems more aware of its revamped trade powers. 
This was exemplified in the attention given to a ‘mere’ resolution of the INTA committee containing 
recommendations for future acceptance of TTIP, which saw 13 other committees drafting opinions 
(European Parliament, 2015). The Commission has stated more than once that they will have to 
take Parliament’s view into account. All this entails a learning process in which the involved 
institutions are looking for a new balance, but which will end up in a constellation where the EP’s 
role vis-à-vis the Council and the Commission has (relatively) risen (Van den Putte et al., 2014)  
The important thing to see is that the EP’s increased role is a facilitator for several mechanisms 
related to societal politicization. Interest groups now have a new stage to lobby on trade policy; 
MEPs are in the spotlights (and no longer overlooked) when talking about trade issues; media sense 
the importance of these debates and bring them into the spotlight, which in this way inform public 
opinion; societal awareness gives an even bigger incentive for MEPs to take a stance, and for public 
interest groups to show that they are present (and on the look for support and financial resources); 
around the European Parliament, opinions are voiced, crystallized and furthered, in an attempt to 
influence trade policy. How these factors relate (and probably mutually reinforce each other) is not 
entirely clear, but the main conclusion is that the potential for contestation has expanded.   
Thirdly, there may now be ingredients for a politicization ‘feedback cycle’ present. Increasing 
authority and the rising role of the main electoral European body are significant parts, of course, 
but there is more. A politicized issue such as TTIP engages a lot of people – citizens, activists, 
journalists politicians – who become aware and undergo learning processes about the EU, trade 
and the importance of both. This may make those people more susceptible or even willing to engage 
(or to have an opinion) on other (trade) issues8. Public responsiveness to policy output is 
furthermore expected exactly in those domains that have witnessed some extent of popular 
salience, which means that changes in salience (such as a hotly debated topic) can structure future 
responsiveness (Franklin & Wlezien, 1997). This subsequent ‘mental shift’ therefore provides fertile 
ground for future issues or procedures to become politicized as well. In the words of Schmitter 
(1969): “one could hypothesize that, given the above, there will be a shift in actor expectations and 
loyalty toward the new regional center” (p. 166).  
Maybe more importantly, NGOs that have mobilized and built up expertise may permanently 
remain active in the trade field. In fact, civil society activism on TTIP has started with those NGOs 
that were already present and campaigning around the millennial turn (grouped around the 
                                                          
8 Or make them reject the debate and the EU outright. Nevertheless, this is ‘better’ than being unaware 
or having no opinion at all.  
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Seattle2Brussels network, De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015, p. 107). Trade activists now see TTIP as a 
new defining moment in civil society activism on trade (ibid.). This points to NGO networks and 
processes that reach further than one episode. Especially the linking of these so-called non-
traditional NGOs (environmental, development, consumer, citizen groups) may prove to be 
essential in building ‘global activism’, no longer confined to one branch of criticism, but united in 
their push for another trade regime. It goes without saying that mass communication and transport 
improvements have made the sustainability of such networks and information spreading more 
durable and robust (Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Smythe & Smith, 2006). 
Even though TTIP is certainly an extreme (and maybe unique) case, the issues under negotiation 
will be increasingly included in other bi- and multilateral fora as well. Potential consequences on 
trade polity (such as transparency changes, changing consultation practices, more involvement of 
national parliaments), politics, such as interest groups behaving differently according to issue 
salience (Culpepper, 2010; Salisbury, 1984; Schattschneider, 1960), or policy (Dür et al., 2015; 
Rauh, 2013) that result from this singular episode, could clear the road for potential mobilization 
or engagement in the future. In this sense, politicization leads to consequences that spur more 
politicization.   
If the above logic holds, then what we witness is not only the politicization of TTIP, but a spike in 
the politicization of European trade policy or the EU in general. TTIP serves as a stepping stone for 
a bigger debate about European trade policy (and the powers of the EU in general), of which 
dynamics and consequences should not stop when TTIP is concluded (or rejected). The spike of 
attention that TTIP is now causing is itself the result of an interplay of variables, but on its own 
adds to a general layer of politicization of trade policy, or even the EU itself. Should global activism 
drop significantly after TTIP (such as we have seen during the mid-2000s9), it will be equally 
interesting to investigate what made up for the brake.  
3 – Politicization: elements, manifestations and causes 
 
Until now I have given several reasons why we should study TTIP and trade policy through 
politicization glasses. However, I have only given some very general definitions and showed that 
there are actually different processes or manifestations commonly associated with a ‘politicized’ 
issue or institution. This section therefore gives a selected overview of the general politicization 
literature and pinpoints identifying/operational elements, the interlinking of manifestations, 
longer-term causes and explanations for the (differentiated) picture.  
                                                          
9 This is partly attributed to to the stalled Doha talks, and to the fact that many NGOs changed their 
position to being more ‘reformist’ rather than outright ‘rejectionist’ (Hopewell, 2015). 
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3.1 Operational elements 
In the previous section some general definitions of societal politicization were presented that all in 
some way or another describe an evolution whereby the divide between, on the one hand, a publicly 
contested sphere of national politics and, on the other hand, the elite-driven game of international 
relations, is becoming increasingly blurred (Schmidtke, 2014; Zürn et al., 2012). Political 
sociologists or comparativists frequently use the concept to identify moves away from indifference 
or consensus with respect to decision-making processes in the EU (Green‐Pedersen, 2012; Hooghe 
& Marks, 2009; Hutter & Grande, 2014), or regional integration exercises in general (Hurrelmann 
& Schneider, 2014). International Relations scholars ( grouped around the work of Michael Zürn) 
see the EU as the most explicit case of politicization of international authority of international 
institutions (such as IMF, WTO, UN) (De Wilde, 2015). In this sense it refers to the situation where 
citizens and civil society increasingly become aware of the institution’s relevance and voice 
questions on how much power such institutions should have.  
Even though multiple definitions exist, there are several recurring elements in all of them. In the 
introduction to a special issue on politicization, De Wilde, Leupold, and Schmidtke (2015) 
distinguish four vital parts: a component of importance (actors perceive EU issues as increasingly 
important for their interests or values), a behavioral component (actors increase spending 
resources to influence or contest the EU), a preference component (diverging views with what the 
EU should or should not do) and a socialization component (more societal actors become aware of 
EU affairs and even start engaging with them). Several authors have subsequently conceptualized 
‘politicization’ as a multi-dimensional concept, taking (some of) these four components into 
account with differing weight (Zürn, 2014; De Wilde, 2015). De Wilde et al. (2015) come to the 
conclusion that in recent studies these can be boiled down to: (i) growing salience, (ii) polarization 
of opinion, and (iii) an expansion of actors/audiences. 
The first element, growing salience, literally means a rise in importance of the EU or its policy 
making (De Wilde et al., 2015; Epstein & Segal, 2000; Warntjen, 2012). This can manifest itself as 
a growing awareness of the existence of the EU, and then means a greater interest in and concern 
about decision-making processes, issues or institutions (Zürn, 2014). It is about visibility and the 
extent to which decision-making is “contemporaneously perceivable by the […] public” (Rauh, 
2011). It also manifests itself in the amount of public statements by political parties in national 
election campaigns (Wonka, 2015) or the number of parliamentary questions on EU issues. In mass 
media, it is discernable in the number of articles devoted to the EU or a specific policy. 
Secondly, actor or audience expansion points to a greater amount of citizens, groups, politicians 
(in general: actors) who dedicate resources (such as time, money, expertise) to follow and engage 
with EU topics or to the European level in general. Again this may translate into different 
manifestations (Zürn, 2015): a passive audience expansion, with more individuals (with different 
characteristics) becoming interested and engaged in the issue; different types of collective actors 
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mobilizing and spending resources (Stuckatz, 2015); or an expansion of the contributors to a 
political debate, going wider than merely executive actors (Leupold, 2015). 
Thirdly, contestation or polarization refers to conflicting views of the common good and opposing 
demands put to political institutions (Zürn, 2014). It has also been defined as taking a more extreme 
position, which involves a depletion of people without an opinion on the EU or a specific policy (De 
Wilde et al., 2015). Again this can be about different beliefs about an issue (or the EU) between 
citizens; or mobilized groups that take opposing positions; or a polarization of claims-making, often 
represented in mass media (Zürn, 2015)10. 
3.2 Manifestations 
What should be clear is that politicization is clearly manifested in different ways11. In the 
classification above, for example, De Wilde et al. (2015) pinpoint the three operationalized 
elements, but refer to distinct ways in which these are expressed or researchable for scientists. 
Several authors have focused on politicization as manifested in public debates, stating that 
politicization is best dealt with as a discursive phenomenon and that it is not sufficient that people 
become aware, but that it becomes salient in political communication (Green-Pedersen, 2012; 
Hurrelmann & Schneider, 2014). This is a legitimate statement, but it is not only when something 
“appears often, if different opinions exist and if different social actors are involved” that we speak 
of politicization (Zürn, 2015). This interpretation is too focused and closely aligned with seeing 
politicization as a communicative effort that can only be assessed through mass media (ibid.) 
Several authors therefore argue therefore to make explicit distinctions between these different 
manifestations of politicization (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2015; Zürn, 2015). The process or 
product of politicization (De Wilde, 2007) can be witnessed in (a) political attitudes or beliefs: 
rising awareness and interest in an issue, or recognition that an institution can make binding 
decisions; (b) political activities: increase of resources spent on influencing negotiations by e.g. 
interest groups or political parties; and (c) political communication: public debates with conflicting 
views of the common good and opposing demands put to political institutions12. 
The lion’s share of contemporaneous research on societal politicization has focused, as said, on 
political communication, and especially on content analysis of mass media (De Wilde, 2015; 
Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2015). That is also why contemporary operationalization of the different 
elements (salience, actor expansion and polarization) are often expressed in mass media terms13. 
                                                          
10 For more info on the method of ‘claims-making analysis’, see De Wilde (2013). 
11 It should be noted that in the literature ‘domestic’ societal politicization is identified, instead of 
European politicization. If viewed from the ‘public debates’ viewpoint, Risse (2015), for example, argues 
that we cannot yet observe a European public sphere, but several ‘Europeanized’ national public spheres. 
12 The different manifestations could be said to be present at micro, meso or macro level (Zürn, 2015). 
13 Salience is then, e.g., measured by the number and share of articles about an issue in an analyzed 
newspaper; for actor expansion claims are coded to check who is participating in debates; polarization 
is characterized by disagreement between (political) parties, visible in those articles. See Leupold (2015) 
for one example. 
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However, equating politicization with what is discussed in mass media seems to include 
unnecessary and exclude relevant things (Zürn, 2015). We therefore need to include different 
manifestations as a broader conception of politicization. Table 2 below is presented by Zürn (2015) 
to clarify the point. 
 Salience 
Contestation 
(polarization) 
Expansion of 
actors 
Micro (beliefs) 
Importance relative 
to other issues or 
institutions 
Different beliefs 
about the issue or the 
institution 
Individuals with 
different traits (social 
status, sex, ethnic 
gropu etc.) see the 
issue or institution as 
important 
Meso 
(mobilization) 
Importance relative 
to other targets of 
mobilization 
Mobilized groups 
stand for different 
positions 
Many different types 
of groups mobilize 
Macro (public 
debates) 
Often mentioned in 
media (relative to 
other issues) 
Polarization of 
statements/claims 
Expansion of 
contributors to the 
debate 
Table 2. Operational elements and different manifestations of politicization. Source: Zürn (2015) 
These ‘levels’ taken together give a broader conception of “something” that is politicized, and 
specifically adds more nuance to a question that is otherwise answered by either “yes, we see ‘some’ 
politicization” or “no, apparently nothing is politicized here”. It can therefore occur that in some 
Member States there is politicization on the micro and meso level, but not discernable in public 
debates. The “full” or “empty” discussion (Baglioni & Hurrelmann, 2015) must therefore be left 
behind by giving this kind of broader overview of how the process of politicization manifests itself, 
which opens up new explanatory avenues.  
This links back to the discussion of societal forces in TTIP of the previous chapter. The different 
manifestations of the politicization of TTIP, such as growing awareness among citizens, 
mobilization by civil/citizen groups or public debates, are all part and parcel of the same process 
(Zürn, 2015). So even though the specific links (such as media influence on public opinion) are 
useful, we should not treat them in isolation here. Zürn (2015) states that we especially need to 
know more about the role of interest groups and CSOs in the process of politicization, as this will 
make for thicker description of politicization trajectories. 
3.3 Causes 
Nowadays there seems to be consensus that “something like politicization has occurred since the 
mid-1980s” (Schmitter, 2009), yet the driving force and – importantly – how and why it is apparent 
in some Member States and not in others is still under debate. The contemporaneous literature 
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investigating the driving forces of politicization (Zürn et al., 2012; Schmidtke, 2014; Rixen & Zangl, 
2012; Schmidtke, 2015) postulates several explanations (De Wilde, 2015), with increasing political 
authority as the most common claim (Schmidtke, 2015; Zürn et al., 2012). 
In this authority transfer hypothesis, political authority is defined as prescriptions, rules and 
orders that are recognized as being collectively binding14. Increasing political authority means that, 
at some point, a level is reached where institutions can make collectively binding decisions on 
matters that were previously predominantly domestic jurisdiction (Cooper, Hawkins, Jacoby, & 
Nielson, 2008), so-called behind-the-border issues (Zürn, 2004). One can subsequently expect 
increasing awareness, more mobilization (against it, or for more use of it) and more public debates 
in mass media (Zürn et al. 2012). De Wilde and Zürn (2012) discern level (centralization and 
majoritarian decision-making powers (Börzel, 2005)), scope (breadth, increasingly in domestic 
politics) and inclusiveness (constituencies affected and how they can affect the institution) as 
central components of authority. The greater these elements, the larger the political authority a 
specific international institution has, which will – according to this strand – lead to increasing 
politicization as citizens are more frequently confronted with effects resulting from this decision-
making (Schmidtke, 2014).  
However, there is no one on one relationship between authority transfers and politicization. If this 
were true, we would see the same level of politicization in all Member States, since they are subject 
– more or less – to the same authority. Country-specific economic and socio-cultural characteristics 
are important mediating factors for the authority transfer to result in politicization (Schmidtke, 
2015) and their explanatory power cannot be underestimated (De Wilde et al. 2015). Describing a 
singular ‘politicization of EU governance’ is therefore no longer tenable and should be replaced by 
a ‘differentiated politicization’ (De Wilde et al. 2015): “differentiated forms, degrees and 
manifestations (…) depend on the time, setting and location in which it unfolds”. They conclude 
that we need to take into account country-specific relationships with the EU, the varying political 
and economic systems and – very specifically – different windows of opportunity (such as elections, 
crises or referenda) (De Wilde & Zürn, 2012). 
This range of intermediating variables is rather extensive, and how these fit into each other is the 
recent focus of scholarly literature on politicization (De Wilde, 2015; Zürn, 2015). Identity plays an 
important role, for example (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2012). In this argument, “societal modernization” 
(Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) such as modern ICT and knowledge evolutions should facilitate citizens’ 
(intellectual) skills required to recognize global interdependencies, leading to a “cognitive 
mobilization” (Zürn et al. 2012) and making them more aware about international problems, thus 
leading to more public awareness and politicization (Schmidtke, 2014). The rise of public activism 
is thus conceptualized here as linked to cultural and technological advances in sustaining a 
                                                          
14 Two subtypes can further be discerned: one that focuses on accepting the right that someone makes 
collectively binding decisions; the other one focuses on accepting that international institutions can 
enforce these decision too (Zürn et al., 2012). 
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transnational civil society, that can mediate a variety of views across borders. In this view it is 
expected that politicization positively correlates with economic interdependence and the 
fundamental (global) civil society structure (and density, cfr. Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Rixen & Zangl, 
2012). Vice versa, the identity variable also focuses on citizens holding an exclusive nationalist 
identity (Ecker-Ehrhardt, 2014; Hooghe & Marks, 2009). These people feel (threatened to be) left 
out with an ever larger connected and rapidly-moving world and are therefore extremely critical of 
integration steps that lead to more authority for supranational bodies. However, this is expected to 
be important only if right-wing parties ‘tap into’ these feelings (Green‐Pedersen, 2012; Hoeglinger, 
2015)15. The political economy literature, furthermore, holds that individuals that expect to benefit 
from an authority transfer will support more integration, and vice versa (Eichenberg & Dalton, 
2007). The distributive economic effects will thus shape the level of domestic societal politicization.  
It is becoming increasingly clear that these hypotheses are somehow linked to each other. Authors 
have converged to seeing authority (especially centralized decision-making) as a driving factor 
(Rixen & Zangl, 2012; Schmidtke, 2014; Zürn et al. 2012; De Wilde & Zürn, 2012), conditioned by 
“cognitive mobilization” (Schmidtke, 2014), political opportunity structures (De Wilde & Zürn, 
2012), perceived lack of legitimacy (Rauh, 2013) or distributive effects and national socio-cultural 
contexts that allow for country-specific timing, strength and direction (Schmidtke, 2015). These 
contributions do not challenge the authority transfer hypothesis, but are complementary to it 
(Zürn, 2015).  
Again the overarching remarks by Michael Zürn are guiding here, as he points to two distinctions 
(see table 3). Firstly, he distinguishes between authority as the driving force, and mobilization 
resources and political opportunity structures as conditioning variables. Secondly, this distinction 
is useful both on Member State and European level. It is – in this logic – possible that Member 
States are all subject to a certain authority transfer, but that already on this overarching level, the 
potential for politicization increases when there are European elections, crises or transnational 
NGOs successfully campaigning on a certain issue16. Besides this common driver, country-specific 
exposure to authority (e.g. a membership debate in that country only), and national mobilization 
resources and political opportunity structures will dampen or enlarge domestic politicization.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
15 Cfr. For example the ‘sleeping giant’ debate on EU integration (Van der Eijk & Franklin, 2001) 
16 He argues, however, that the absence of “real competition” in EU elections, or successful 
transnationally mobilizing NGOs may hamper transnational politicization. 
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Commonalities/Community 
level 
Variance/National level 
Authority Authority transfer 
Membership debates; 
Different affectedness 
Mobilization resources 
and political 
opportunity structures 
European elections; European-
wide referendum; crises; NGOs; 
access to IOs 
Party and cleavage structure; 
perceived economic costs; 
national referenda 
Table 3. Types of explanatory factors of EU politicization, according to Zürn (2015).  
In the previous section I already pointed to the presence and increasing relevance of authority as a 
driver of contestation, which is here supported by scholarly contributions. However, not only the 
role of authority, but especially the role of a wide array of intermediating factors that explain place-
bound manifestations of politicization can be investigated in this framework as well. In the case of 
TTIP, for example, this directs us to analyze, amongst others: the presence of radical-right parties; 
the amount of people holding exclusively national identities (or the amount of people holding anti-
Americanism or anti-free trade beliefs in general); the civil society structure in a given country 
(such as amount of NGOs working on trade, and their networks); political economy variables such 
openness to trade, dependence on trade, specific sector statistics that recall distributive effects of 
trade policy; or support for EU supranational policies in other domains.  
3.4 Cycles and consequences 
 
Figures that chronologically graph evolutions of EU politicization show a rising basic trend, with 
very periodical ups and downs (see figure 1). Intuitively it follows that even if an institution is 
becoming increasingly politicized, this will not persistently play out, nor will every policy output or 
part of the process be subject to close scrutiny and the same constraining powers. Several authors 
have pointed towards such a distinction between general politicization and a contemporaneous, 
time-bound, episode of politicization. Schmidtke (2014) elaborates on this by referring to Downs 
(1972) article on ‘attention cycles’. The cyclical nature observed, he argues, can be attributed to a 
more general feature of public debates: they are regularly characterized by episodes of non-
attention and low issue salience and times of high attention and issue salience. Rauh (2013) also 
distinguishes convincingly between a general EU politicization trend and contemporaneous public 
salience of specific issues at stake. De Wilde (2011) furthermore states that issue politicization is 
very time and space specific that can ignite in certain Member States, but die a quick death quickly 
after, a phenomenon dubbed elsewhere as ‘episodes of contention’ (McAdam et al., 2009).  
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Figure 1. Relative EU politicization: linear trend with spikes. Source: Rauh (2013). 
These various authors have different conceptions of this contemporaneous element, with some 
labelling it salience (Schmidtke, 2014; Rauh, 2013) and others ‘politicization’ (De Wilde, 2011). 
Nevertheless, some distinction between a general politicization and a short-term component is 
apparent. Rauh (2013) developed a model to account for both (see figure 2). The logic is that 
(domestic) societal politicization of EU integration incentivizes the Commission to think about 
public interests when developing policy, but this link is mediated by the salience of the specific 
issue. So even though the EU is becoming increasingly politicized, it is only when the Commission 
reasonably assumes the issue is salient (or politicized; depending on how you conceptualize this) 
for the public that it will ponder to take public interests into account. If this is the case, the public’s 
evaluation of the particular issue feeds back into the general political evaluation of the EU (Rauh, 
2013). 
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Figure 2. Theoretical model of politicization and public salience, according to Rauh (2013). 
Rauh’s (2013) framework first of all supports the idea that politicization has constraining 
consequences, as described in TTIP in paragraph 2.2. He showed that in times of both high 
politicization and high public salience, the Commission was responsive to interventionist measures 
in consumer policy. In the broader area of International Relations, Zürn (2014) also hypothesizes 
that politicized international institutions will less likely be captured by special interests and will at 
the same time be more responsive to societal demands than in the case of ‘executive 
multilateralism’ (Zürn, 2004)17. Even more general, politicization leads to deeper, fundamental 
questions about the legitimacy of the institution who produces the output (Statham & Trenz, 2015), 
which could drive dynamics to changes in polity, politics and even policy. Research on the 
consequences of politicization is very scarce, and is therefore an important avenue to pursue. 
Figure 2 furthermore adds to our understanding of a certain feedback cycle (see part 2.3), which 
makes it increasingly relevant to study politicization in trade. The politicization of a specific issue 
involves more people or collective actors that were previously unaware of the specific case, and even 
sensitizes them to the importance of this governance layer in general. If the Commission responds 
to this contestation (with changes in politics, polity or policy), this could increase the politicization 
of the EU itself. A rising general politicization of the EU (or of a specific field) increases the potential 
that international institutions and their output will make it to citizens or interest groups’ radar 
(probably in those domains where it has the most power/authority, exclusive competences), and so 
forth. De Wilde (2011) argues in this respect that particular episodes of contention “stack up and 
overlap” which points to “trends in the politicization of European integration” (p. 563), even if 
periods of ‘discursive calm’ are present between democratic moments such as elections or 
referendums (De Wilde & Lord, 2015).  The “(…) nature of conflict and the arguments made during 
such periods have lasting effects on the public discourse about Europe in the member states in 
question (De Wilde, Michailidou, & Trenz, 2013).  
                                                          
17 This refers to a decision-making mode in which governmental representatives coordinate their policies 
internationally, with little national parliamentary control and away from public scrutiny. 
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Concluding this section, it seems that the literature on general EU politicization processes has much 
to offer for our understanding of TTIP and trade policy, and we should start to investigate its links. 
However, this section showed as well that – partly due to the relatively recent nature of this 
literature domain – several concepts, links and deeper understanding of politicization are still not 
entirely clear-cut. Because of this, the argument that research on trade could benefit from 
politicization literature, can be reversed as well. Trade policy should even be a most likely case for 
politicization to occur, as it is one of the most authoritative domains in the EU. Another one, 
monetary policy, has already been subject to several politicization studies (Leupold, 2015; Statham 
& Trenz, 2015; Wonka, 2015). These fields should offer the best prospects of investigating the links 
between longer- and short-term spikes, and authority and mediating variables. Secondly, it is often 
heard that longer-term uneasiness with several criticisms of the EU are crystallized in the TTIP 
debate. This includes the (perceived) power of and lawmaking for big business, secrecy of decision-
making, lack of transparency and democratic channels to voice opinions, and fears connected to 
neoliberal policies that would undermine domestic rules and standards. If only part of the 
opposition is directed towards the EU itself instead of just TTIP, this ‘case study’ adds to a more 
general understanding of politicization of the EU, which is – as argued in the seminal paper by 
(Mair, 2007) – not susceptible to ‘organized criticism’ on a supranational level.  
4 – Conclusion 
 
Through TTIP, European trade policy has become politicized. In this paper I argue that we need to 
explicitly link the scholarly domains of trade and politicization in order to explain the current 
highly-controversial topic of Transatlantic trade negotiations in several respects. Both the 
interlocking societal forces between public opinion, interest group activity, media and political 
activity, and the differentiated picture of politicization throughout Europe, merit a broader 
understanding of this episode. The concept and literature on domestic societal politicization proves 
to be a fruitful addition for this endeavor. Furthermore, the Commission – aware of the polarized 
debate –  has started to shift its policy on some crucial elements of the deal, which shows that even 
technocratic actors are to some extent susceptible to flaring societal demands. This in itself is 
another reason why we should focus on the consequences of this concept. Lastly, I also argue that 
the link between both fields will become increasingly relevant to take into account, as the ever-
increasing authority of European trade policy, and the renewed active role of the European 
Parliament in trade, provide the necessary ingredients for longer-term feedback cycles that 
permanently direct attention to this supranational level that has a profound impact on our daily 
lives. 
Throughout the paper I have given pointers to how further research should continue. In essence, I 
see three broad components of this agenda. First, attention should shift to description. Besides 
some preliminary accounts, there is no thorough mapping and measurement of politicization in 
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TTIP (nor trade in general). In line with the different manifestations of politicization, this should 
primarily focus on the mobilization of civil society actors (type, positions, activities), the 
involvement of politicians (European and national), citizen awareness (through surveys or focus 
groups) and these trends and differences between Member States and between actors. Secondly, 
those politicization dynamics merit explanation: why does politicization occur more in some 
Member State than in others? This analysis should be guided by content analysis of the TTIP 
negotiations and semi-structured interviews with decision-makers and civil society organizations, 
which could result in a QCA-analysis of the necessary and sufficient determinants to explain 
debates/mobilization/awareness of TTIP in a particular Member States. Thirdly, the more durable 
consequences of this episode on the short and longer term should be explored. This involves 
possible changes in organization/polity (involvement of governments/parliaments, transparency 
and consultation practices, increasing NGO capacity/resources), politics (changing trade lobby 
behavior) or policy.  
In the end, this research also adds to more normative questions in trade policy, as opinions about 
the effects and desirability of politicization for this field differ. Some authors have long called for 
more discussion and spirited debate about EU trade, which would enhance the democratic 
legitimacy of the field (e.g. Devuyst, 2013). Others are more cautious about the effects, as it could 
lead to simplistic discussions in what is unavoidably a technical area, with negative consequences 
for trade policy’s effectiveness and efficiency (Meunier, 2003). The profoundness of this dilemma 
is exemplified in the TTIP debate, so we should no longer hesitate to incorporate politicization 
concepts into the study of trade policy.  
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